Adornos Poetics of Critique (Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy)
New York: Vintage, — Bruxelles: Ousia, — Paris: Gallimard, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, — See Foucault, Les Mots et les choses, For instance, Sartre noted in his journal that Simone de Beauvoir thought that the human species came into being and would pass away at a future time. Gallimard, New York: Harper and Row, Foucault, Histoire de la folie, Le pouvoir et la bataille.
- Adorno's Poetics of Critique.
- Gamblers Moon.
- Similar authors to follow;
Nantes, Editiions Pleins Feux. Wood, ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 97— Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge: MIT Press, 83— New York: Pantheon, — The Death of Man 98 99 67 Foucault Reader, 58— Ralph Manheim. New Haven: Yale University Press, London: Routledge, — New York: Vintage, xi. James M. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 12— Foucault, The Order of Things, Gay, who usefully considers humanism as the revival of classical letters, devotes insufficient attention to its other dimensions.
Thomas Williams. Indianapolis: Hackett. There must be hundreds of references to Derrida and Davidson for every one to Foucault. There is little if any disagreement between Rorty and Foucault on many philosophical questions. For instance, they agree that Nietzsche and developments in postmodern European philosophy, especially Heidegger, make epistemology untenable. They both consider the idea of truth as adequacy or correspondence no less untenable, and for the same reasons.
Both advance nominalistic ideas of knowledge and truth. Both are historicist, ironical about the contingency of things. Why then the reticence to work with Foucault as Rorty does his other authorities? One reason has less to do with Foucault than with his mostly American following.
I never thought of looking at it that way. He redescribes in imaginative new ways institutions that Rorty does not want to have redescribed, because his loyalty toward them is not as it were extensional, not independent of how they are described.
Foucault may not feel that loyalty, or perhaps chooses to keep it private. What may be mere discretion Rorty reads as evasion, ambivalence, and unwarranted skepticism. The merits of this argument remain to be seen. Before I get to that, I want to develop some of the substantial agreement between Foucault and Rorty in their view of knowledge and truth.
Their ideas are similar, as is the motivation for developing them, their discontent with epistemology. Knowledge after Nietzsche The textbook questions of epistemology include the definition of knowledge; the nature of evidence; the criterion of truth; and the question of certainty—do we have it? Must knowledge be certain? What is the point of these questions, or the value of theories that answer them?
What good can be expected from inquiry in this direction?
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Two answers are traditional. The first, shared by Plato, Locke, and Kant, is that a theory of knowledge is a kind of logic or methodology of knowledge, and can be expected to make our knowing more disciplined, rigorous, and efficient. A second rationale for epistemology is to provide philosophers with an occasion to stand up for values thought to be under attack by reckless skeptics of reason and truth. Despite different motivations, procedures in epistemology remain similar.
The idea is to establish a meta-order in the field of knowledge, identifying the forms of verifiable knowledge, and elucidating the criteria of evidence and truth. It also became traditional to understand truth as the identity of what is and what is said, ontos and logos—the onto-logical theory of truth, which degenerated into the so-called correspondence theory. How could knowledge be false? But it is an assumption, and one with an important implication, namely, that knowing has at its core, as its unit, or primary exemplification something that can be true.
That defines the proposition. In a blow, knowledge that fails to fit the format of a logical proposition and this includes everything material, mechanical, artifactual disappears from view. In a wonderful way even radical postmodern nominalists like Foucault and Rorty confirm this presumption, following the path Plato started in philosophy of excluding techne and its works from philosophical ideas about knowledge.
Foucault never did that, perhaps because he thought Nietzsche already had.
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In the Third Essay of the Genealogy of Morals he argues that the intellectual passion for truth is an unconscious religious passion, a way for atheists still to believe in God. To turn away from religion because it is untrue is not the triumph of rationality over superstition. It is a new superstition, or rather, one whose superstitious quality is newly apparent, especially to those who may still feel attached to the idea that truth is divine. Modern ideals of truth, science, and enlightenment have a dark side, an unconscious aspect in which they participate in the very irrationality they profess to overcome.
The death of God is just the beginning. Truth is next. Then Science. Nietzsche expects a violent Selbstaufhebung of Western reason, pushing modern culture over the edge of the nihilism that has haunted it since antiquity. The problem of knowledge in postmodern thought begins here. Beginning a bit later, the American Pragmatists, especially William James, independently came to similar conclusions. These days, even Analytic philosophers have mostly abandoned the correspondence theory. Analytic philosophers have so far refused to draw this conclusion.
Continental postmoderns, however, all draw it, and pursue different strategies for dealing with it.
Let me briefly touch on a few others before taking up Foucault. It is not really a problem about knowledge. It is a problem about being especially about the relation between being and our being. Knowledge of truth is not the primary meaning or value of knowledge. What comes first, and makes knowledge of truth possible, is how-to competence with tools. Scientific knowledge of truth is a modification of technical competence, introducing special tools and specially contrived applications, as in a laboratory.
That was the argument of Being and Time In later works Heidegger emphasizes the genealogy of modern science and technology. From the critique of truth Nietzsche steps forward to new problems of knowledge and science. The sciences will happily ignore philosophy and keep doing what they do best, calm in their mystified false consciousness about truth. A little false consciousness is desirable in the sciences. From knowing not what they do methodologically, they are that much surer of their discipline, that is, of methodical progress within an unproblematic framework.
False consciousness has a protective function. He follows postmodern European philosophy in rejecting a metaphysical theory. As he sees it, the critique of correspondence is one of the few good ideas Nietzsche had.
Guide Adornos Poetics of Critique (Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy)
He looks for it in the ethics of discourse. Truth is not a relation to a corresponding thing in itself. It is a social relation, a norm. Having the truth is not the same as having a good argument or interesting evidence. The difference between justification and truth is not a difference of ontology or epistemology. It is a normative difference, a difference in the responsibilities of a speech act, and a difference in how we relate to each other in the public space of reasons.
When I advance a claim as the truth, I undertake the distinctive obligation of ensuring that my statement holds up under any challenge, from any interlocutor, in any context. I commit myself to the universal validity of my statement.
You cannot tell a credible metanarrative in a time like ours. Knowledge is no longer a Foucault and the New Pragmatism 73 training for minds, a form of Bildung, a care of the self, or a patriotic duty. It is a product, produced for sale, consumed to produce more. Its value has nothing to do with wisdom, enlightenment, or emancipation. We cannot trust knowledge to favor the Good, nor can we believe that truth will make us free. My problem is to see how men govern themselves and others by the production of truth. I would like, in short, to resituate the production of true and false at the heart of historical analysis and political critique.
Its cause is in the language-game, the discursive formation, not the being of a being.
Is it really money? Both questions assume that there is more to these values than currency, which Foucault rejects. Like prices or money, truth-values are purely relational, conventional, ultimately arbitrary artifacts of discursive economy. A statement has no inherent, discoursetranscendent, purely logical true-or-false, regardless of what, if anything, people make of it. The price of a commodity is what it sells for.
The historical and practical if not onto-logical truth-value of a statement is what it passes for. The important thing is not being true but passing, currency. But it can and does govern that is, modify, conduct the circulation of statements, or what is taken seriously, what passes for true.
It is this currency, this circulation in an economy of serious speech acts, that is decisive for both history and experience.